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INTRODUCTION
In May 2002, the Bush administration "un-signed" the Rome Statute, the
multilateral treaty paving the way for a permanent International Criminal Court
("ICC"),' by declaring invalid President Clinton's signing of the same treaty during
his final day in office. Subsequently, President Bush signed the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act ("ASPA"), 2a law designed to ensure that
American and allied soldiers and government officials would not be subject to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. By August 2003, the Bush administration had signed
bilateral "impunity agreements" with more than thirty-five countries guaranteeing
that United States troops would be immune from the prosecutorial reach of the
ICC. 3 Likewise, the United Nations resolution authorizing the deployment of a
* Editor-in-Chief, INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 79; J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington; M.A., 2001, The University of Chicago Divinity
School; B.A., 1997, Wabash College. This Note is for my grandfather, Dr. C.W. Worth, who,
leading by example, has always encouraged a deep respect for critical inquiry. I would also
like to thank my wife, Susan, for her constant encouragement and support.
1. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute], reprinted in WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 167-247 (2001).
2. See generally American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401-33
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003).
3. See Emira Woods & William D. Hartung, Bush's African Agenda, THE NATION, Aug.
4, 2003, at 6 (noting the State Department's plans to "cut off military aid to nearly three
dozen countries-including several on the President's [African visit] itinerary... [-]if they
did not sign 'impunity agreements' indicating that they would never refer a U.S. citizen for
prosecution to the newly operating International Criminal Court"). See generally Around the
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multinational force to Liberia, which was sponsored by the United States and
adopted by the Security Council on August 1, 2003, contained lanfuage
guaranteeing any U.S. troops immunity from the International Criminal Court.
Interestingly, the media debate surrounding the Bush administration's
controversial rejection of the ICC highlights a sharp ideological schism regarding
the role the United States should play in the creation and implementation of a
permanent international criminal tribunal. While some commentators argue that the
creation of a supranational criminal court is inevitable in the modem global context,
and the United States should not shirk its responsibility to contribute to the
legitimization and development of such a court,5 others argue that the sovereignty
of the United States would be invaded by a court wielding universal jurisdiction to
try global crimes.6
This debate represents a contemporary moment in an ongoing philosophical
discourse about the meaning of sovereignty as it applies to the nation-state-a
discourse altered dramatically by global denationalization. While critical inquiry
about the meaning of sovereignty in the context of the nation-state is voluminous,
little attention has been paid to how that globally-altered discourse might help
analyze U.S. resistance to a permanent international criminal court. Typically, the
debate has been articulated within the framework of a dominant, theologically-
derived, ideology of sovereignty and has not questioned the historical validity of
the discourse. While opponents of the ICC insist that sovereignty, indispensable to
state legitimacy, is necessarily inalienable without the consequent sacrifice of that
legitimacy, 7 ICC proponents counter that the modern global world is irreconcilably
at odds with the classical conception of state sovereignty.
8
World: More Nations Won't Send U.S. Citizens to International Court, SEATTLE TIMES, July
30, 2003, at Al0; U.S. Signs Immunity Pacts with Five Nations, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2003,
at A4.
4. See S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. SCOR, 4803d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
See generally Nicholas Kralev, U.S. Submits U.N. Plan to Send Peacekeepers; Wants
Americans Exempt from International Court, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A14.
5. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, § 1, at 18 (emphasizing that by retracting its signature from the
ICC treaty, the United States will undermine international justice and find itself aligned with
such questionable non-ratifying countries as Syria, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and China);
Editorial, Who is the Rogue?, INTELLIGENCER JOURNAL (Lancaster, Pa.), May 8, 2002, at
A14 (arguing that the signature retraction will not only emphasize the United States'
alignment with questionable international players, but also will prevent the United States
from contributing to the development of a global jurisprudence).
6. See, e.g., Editorial, A Global Special Prosecutor?, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2002, at A26
(arguing that the ICC will be rendered impotent through a perceived lack of legitimacy
stemming from its potential to become politicized and that global justice "is best achieved by
U.S. leadership and military strength").
7. See, e.g., Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 840, 841-44 (2002) (arguing that ratification of the ICC would be
antithetical to national sovereignty because it would undermine the principle that each
sovereign nation-state has the exclusive jurisdictional authority over its own territory).
8. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE, at xviii (New York Press 2000) (1999) (arguing that the United States'
resistance to the ICC confirms that "[t]he movement for global justice has been a struggle
against sovereignty---the doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nation states
asserted by all governments which have refused to subject the treatment they mete out to
their citizens to any independent external scrutiny"); Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance
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This Note will examine untested presuppositions concerning the compatibility
or irreconcilability of the concept of sovereignty with the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court. Specifically, the Note will consider the
United States' historical position regarding the implementation of such a court in
light of the critical scholarly discourse on sovereignty. Part I will delineate the
United States' historical laudation for the establishment of temporary, ad hoc
criminal tribunals. Part II will investigate the United States' seemingly paradoxical
rejection of proposals for the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court. Finally, Part III will briefly investigate the origins of the conception of
sovereignty underlying the United States' historical attitude toward the
adjudication of international criminal law and will consider its continued practical
and theoretical legitimacy. This Part will urge a reformulation of sovereignty that
complements global denationalization and will conclude by considering the
potential impact of this reformulation on the United States' position regarding the
ICC.
I. U.S. VALIDATION OF TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Much of the impetus behind the establishment of the post-World War H
International Military Tribunals ("IMT") at Nirnberg and Tokyo can be attributed
to a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction with the largely unsuccessful attempt to
establish a temporary criminal tribunal following World War 1.9 Article 227 of the
Treaty of Versailles called for the establishment of a temporary international
criminal tribunal to try the German Kaiser "for a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties."' 0 In addition, Articles 228 and
229 provided the authority to try lower officers and soldiers for "acts in violation of
the laws and customs of war."'" Though a few German officers were convicted of
war crimes, the sentences were light. 12 The Netherlands, however, refused to
extradite the German Kaiser, contending that the offense with which he was
charged was not recognized in Dutch law.' 3 Although the tribunal outlined in the
Versailles treaty proved relatively ineffective in securing actual convictions, it
promulgated a philosophical restructuring of the traditional notions of state
to the International Criminal Court- Is the Sword Mightier than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L
L. REv. 213, 215-16 (2000) (arguing that "U.S. opposition [to the ICC] derives
fundamentally from its adherence to the inflexible position that no international court has a
right to override U.S. law," and that this "distorted view of... sovereignty" is "inconsistent
and irreconcilable"); Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International
Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 50, 64-65 (1996)
(arguing that the "Sovereignty Paradigm," which protects the territorial integrity of the
nation-state but permits "radical derogation[s] from the traditional sovereign prerogatives of
states" in order to accommodate certain universal rights, such as human rights, "must be
overthrown because it makes no sense").
9. Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Nuremberg Trials, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 747-48 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997).
10. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 227, 225 Consol. T.S. 285, 285.
11. Id. at 285-86.
12. See Jescheck, supra note 9, at 747-48.
13. See SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 3; Bickley, supra note 8, at 225.
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sovereignty and individual accountability for war crimes. 1
4
A. The International Military Tribunals at Niirnberg and Tokyo
This restructuring was later memorialized in the London Agreement of August
8, 1945, which included the Charter of the IMT to be established at Niirnberg
("Nirnberg Charter"). 15 The IMT was created both "to record the deplorable
history" of Nazism and "to serve as a deterrent to future violations."' 6 The IMT
was monumental in the development of international criminal law, 17 its two most
important contributions being the codification of crimes against humanity and the
inclusion of the concept, simmering since Versailles, that individual responsibility
would preclude defenses grounded in traditional notions of state sovereignty in the
case of major war crimes. Article 6(a)-(c) of the Nirnberg Charter specifically
codified the three crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal-namely,
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.' 9 Articles (7)-(10)
instituted the idea that state sovereignty would not serve as a defense to these
crimes and that the Tribunal's jurisdictional reach would thereby extend to
individuals accused of these crimes wherever found.20 As the IMT noted in United
States v. von Leeb:
International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the sovereignty
of nations. It may also limit the obligations which individuals owe to their
states, and create for them international obligations which are binding upon
them to an extent that they must be carried out even if to do so violates a
positive law or directive of state.2'
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, who served as Chief Prosecutor at
the Nirnberg trials, opened the prosecution's case on November 21, 1945, by
articulating the importance of individual responsibility in international law: "Th[e]
principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logical one if international
law is to render real help to the maintenance of peace." 22 Jackson further explained,
14. See Bickley, supra note 8, at 224; Remigiusz Bierzanek, The Prosecution of War
Crimes, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 559, 569-71 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
15. See generally London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London
Agreement].
16. Bickley, supra note 8, at 228.
17. See Jescheck, supra note 9, at 747, 752.
18. See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 9 (1995), Bickley, supra
note 8, at 228-29.
19. London Agreement, supra note 15, at 1547. Interestingly, the Allies answered
charges that the retroactive application of "crimes against humanity" would be unjust
because the crime was unknown prior to the creation of the IMT by countering that "the
prohibition of retroactive crimes was a principle of justice, and that it would fly in the face
of justice to leave the Nazi crimes unpunished." SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 6.
20. London Agreement, supra note 15, at 1548.
21. United States v. von Leeb (1948), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 489 (1950).
22. 2 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, at 150 (1947).
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"[T]he ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a system of
international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to law." 23
Understanding that the Ntirnberg tribunal would be susceptible to a loss of
legitimacy if it were perceived by the international community that any established
precedent would be self-contained, Jackson emphasized that the IMT was impartial
24and not simply victor's justice.
To illustrate how the Niirnberg tribunal would render dispassionate and
reasoned judgment, Jackson emphasized, "[The crimes enumerated in the Niirnberg
Charter] are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does
them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others
which we would not be willing to have invoked against us."'25 He later summarized
his point: "[L]et me make one thing clear that while this law is first applied against
German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must
condemn afgression by any other nations, including those which sit here now in
judgment." '
Jackson's suggestion that the crimes with which the Nazi defendants were
charged were theoretically universally applicable lent substantive legitimacy to the
tribunal. Likewise, Jackson emphasized that the IMT was procedurally legitimate
by noting that the common law principles of fundamental fairness would apply at
Ntirnberg. Jackson stated that "the law long has afforded standards by which a
juridical hearing could be conducted to make sure that we punish only the right
men and for the right reasons."
27
In fact, Justice Jackson's desire to make the IMT institutionally legitimate was
not shared by many of his contemporaries. Just prior to the armistice concluding
the Second World War, United States Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau had
sought to convince President Roosevelt to support his plan for the summary
execution of the top Nazi leaders. Morganthau wrote that the Allies should "set up
summary courts-martial. Then they should... place these [Nazi war] criminals on
trial before them within twenty-four hours after they are caught, sentence them to
death... and shoot them in the morning." 28 Morganthau's harsh, retributive sense
of post-war justice was shared by General Eisenhower, who wanted to
"'exterminate all of the [German] General Staff,' which he figured would be 3500
people, as well as the entire Gestapo and all Nazi Party members above the rank of
mayor., 29 Most importantly, American public opinion polls conducted by Gallup in
May 1945 overwhelmingly favored vengeance-driven retribution. A vast majority
of Americans felt that summary execution was the appropriate sentence for German
officials, and rarely did more than ten percent of the respondents favor the granting
of trials. 30 Finally, the Soviet Union, like Morganthau and the American public,
was strongly opposed to adopting the common law principles of procedural fairness
at Nirnberg. I.T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet chief prosecutor at Nirnberg, insisted,
23. Id. at 154.
24. See id. at 101.
25. REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 330 (1945) [hereinafter JACKSON
REPORT].
26. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST THE NAzi WAR CRIMINALS 88 (1946).
27. Id. at 70.
28. GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 10 (2000).
29. Id. at 154.
30. Id. at 160.
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'The fact that the Nazi leaders are criminals has already been established. The task
of the Tribunal is only to determine the measure of guilt of each particular person
and mete out the necessary punishment-the sentences.",31 The Soviets wanted to
make Nirnberg a show trial similar to those instrumental in Stalin's purges. From
the Soviet perspective, a defendant's guilt was ascertained prior to trial through
investigation and accusation. A Soviet trial was a mere procedural formality
designed to calculate the degree of one's guilt.
Though influential members of the Roosevelt Administration, the majority of
the American public, and at least one of the four Allied co-adjudicators were
resolutely opposed to the importation of common law principles of procedural
fairness to Nirnberg, President Truman's decision to appoint Justice Jackson as the
United States' chief prosecutor signaled concern for the IMT's institutional
legitimacy. Jackson, committed to the notion that judicial independence
necessitated the transcendence of politics, lamented that
[t]he Soviet views a court as one of the organs of government power, a
weapon in the hands of the ruling class for the purpose of safeguarding
its interests. [They] find it difficult to accept or to understand the
Anglo-American idea of a court as an independent agency responsible
only before the law.
32
Consequently, when Jackson was confronted with the public opinion polls
confirming that most Americans deemed procedurally fair trials to be an
unnecessary burden in the case of Nazi war criminals, he caustically replied, "I
don't give a damn what the Gallup Poll says. 33
Jackson's opening statement delivered on November 21, 1945--the first
official articulation of the prosecution's case-began the rhetorical process of
legitimizing the IMT procedurally and substantively. Jackson began, "That four
great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of
the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason." 34 Jackson's
suggestion that "Power" acts in the service of "Reason," rather than vice versa, lies
at the heart of the theoretical question of institutional legitimacy. Legitimacy in
international criminal law stems from a particular tribunal's ability to maintain an
air of decorum-a certain collegiality and imperviousness to dispensing retributive
justice. A judgment is not perceived as just if it is thought to simply represent
victor's justice.
Despite Justice Jackson's reassurances that the IMT was a legitimate and
impartial adjudicatory body impervious to enticements to render victor's justice,
the IMT has always been subject to criticism. 35 Even Justice Jackson secretly
revealed to President Truman that the Allied case was rife with hypocrisy.
31. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 25, at 303.
32. Id. at vi (quotation omitted).
33. BASS, supra note 28, at 161.
34. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 3.
35. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 18, at 9.
36. Interestingly, the Tokyo tribunal, modeled on the Ntimberg tribunal and set up to
prosecute Japanese war criminals, was a procedural improvement on Nirnberg. For instance,
defense attorneys were permitted to challenge the court's jurisdiction "on the grounds that it
was 'victor's justice' imposing 'ex post facto criminality."' ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at
222-23. However, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Tokyo tribunal was severely
[Vol. 79:245
ABSOLUTE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Jackson wrote:
[The Allies] have done or are doing some of the very things we are
prosecuting Germans for .... We are prosecuting plunder and our Allies
are practicing it. We say aggressive war is a crime and one of our Allies
asserts sovereignty over the Baltic States based on no title except
conquest.
37
In addition, to insure that the indictments would be pinned exclusively on the Nazi
defendants, the tribunal consistently overruled tu quoque ("I did it, but you did it
too") objections as irrelevant, thereby "silencing any allegations about Allied war
crimes." 38 Finally, the IMT never claimed universal jurisdiction, but instead
"rest[ed] its authority... on the rights of the defeated German State. 39
Once convened, the IMT articulated its own jurisdictional limits: "The making
of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries
to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right
of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by
the civilized world." In this sense, the IMT cannot be understood as a
supranational judicial body but rather as an occupational court, 1 maintaining
interim justice for a defeated state-"a victor's tribunal before which only the
vanquished were called to account for violations of international humanitarian
law.",42 Jackson's idealistic opening statement that the law "condemn[s] aggression
by any other nations, including those which sit here now in judgment,"a must be
considered in light of the Allies' privileged occupational status.
B. The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
During the 1990s, the UN Security Council reasserted that the principle of
individual criminal accountability, stated in the Versailles Treaty and codified by
the IMT, is a principle of international law. In 1993, the Securiy Council created
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). One year later, it
created a second ad hoc tribunal, the International Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"),
modeled on the ICTY, to prosecute serious violations of humanitarian law in
Rwanda. 45 Subject matter jurisdiction for the ad hoc tribunals included grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war,
undermined when the tribunal decided to exempt the Japanese Emperor from trial based on a
politically-inspired decision on the part of the United States occupational government that a
puppet regime headed by Hirohito would be preferable to the possibility of introducing
"communism and chaos" into the region were the Emperor tried and convicted. Id. at 222,
224.
37. ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 68 (1983).
38. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 214-15.
39. Casey, supra note 7, at 856.
40. Id. (citing The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1946)).
41. See Jescheck, supra note 9, at 752.
42. MORRIS & SCHA"R, supra note 18, at 9; see also Casey, supra note 7, at 866.
43. JACKSON, supra note 26, at 88.
44. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
45. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994).
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crimes against humanity, and genocide.46 Authority for creating the two ad hoc
tribunals rested on an innovative interpretation of the UN Charter-in particular, a
reformulation of the potential impact of Chapter VII on the Article 2(7) principle of
non-intervention. 47 Article 2(7) both articulates the general principle of non-
intervention and defines its limits by providing that "th[is] principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. ' 48 Likewise,
Chapter VII grants to the Security Council the authority to determine "the existence
of any threat to the peace" and to "decide what measures shall be taken ... to
maintain or restore international peace and security.", 49 By broadly construing
Article 41, which authorized the Security Council to "decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions," 50 the Security Council determined that it was within its chartered
powers to authorize the creation of the ad hoc tribunals as a means to "maintain or
restore international peace and security."
51
However, the Secretary General's Report, which delineated the legal and
procedural bases for the ICTY, asserted that the authoritative reach of the tribunal
was "circumscribed in scope and purpose. 52 Thus, "The decision d[id] not relate to
the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction in general nor to the
creation of an international criminal court of a permanent nature .... .. By
definition, the lifespan of the ICTY "would be limited to the restoration of peace in
former Yugoslavia., 54 Though this circumscription was broad enough to permit the
prosecutor to investigate allegations about NATO war crimes during the bombing
of Serbia,55 it in fact placed a temporal and territorial limitation on the tribunal. As
one commentator has noted, "ad hoc" is "a weasel Latin phrase used in UN
resolutions as a coded diplomatic signal that the action will not be used as a
precedent to threaten other members" and reflecting "the UN's systemic defect"-
namely, "[o]beisance to member state sovereignty."
'
,
6
II. U.S. REJECTION OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
Despite Justice Jackson's reassurances that the humanitarian laws enumerated
at Nirnberg were impervious to national territorial boundaries, the United States
46. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, arts. 2-5, at 36-38, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report].
47. See Jost Delbriick, Prospects for a "World (Internal) Law?": Legal Developments
in a Changing International System, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 425-28 (2002)
[hereinafter Delbrick, Legal Developments]; Jost Delbriick, Structural Changes in the
International System and its Legal Order: International Law in the Era of Globalization, 1
Swiss REv. INT'L & EUR. L. 1, 10-13 (2001) [hereinafter Delbriick, Structural Changes]. See
generally Jost Delbriick, Commentary on International Law: A Fresh Look at Humanitarian
Intervention Under the Authority of the United States, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992).
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
49. Id. art. 39.
50. Id. art. 41.
51. Id. art. 39.
52. Secretary General's Report, supra note 46, 12.
53. Id.
54. ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 290.
55. See id. at 292.
56. Id. at xix.
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has historically been averse to perceived supranational limitations on its
sovereignty-particularly with regard to international treaties and agreements. This
aversion was evidenced by the debates surrounding the proposed Bricker
Amendment in the 1950s. Similarly, a variant of the conservative Bricker argument
has been articulated in defense of the United States' decision not to ratify the 1998
Rome Statute.
A. Senator Bricker and the Precedent of American Exceptionalism
During the 1950s, conservative members of Congress, led by Senator John
Bricker of Ohio, became alarmed by a perceived threat to federalism posed by the
federal government's right to enter into and enforce international treaties under
Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution. The debate was initially sparked by
Missouri v. Holland,57 a Supreme Court decision in which Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes concluded that Congress possesses broader powers in the realm of foreign
relations than it does with respect to domestic affairs. 58 The case involved
Congress's authority to implement a treaty governing migratory birds that
conflicted with Missouri's own view of the proper regulation. 59 Holmes noted that
"the power to make treaties is delegated expressly" to the federal government.
60
Thus, while "[a]cts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution .... treaties are declared to be so when made under
the authority of the United States."
61
The implication of Missouri v. Holland was that a treaty could be used to grant
the federal government authority over the states which otherwise would not have
been constitutionally permitted. In fact, the specific catalyst for the Bricker debate
in the 1950s was a California state court decision that invalidated a state law on the
grounds that the law violated the UN Charter.6 2 The court concluded that "[tihe
position of this country in the family of nations forbids trafficking in innocuous
generalities but demands that every State in the Union accept and act upon the [UN]
Charter according to its plain language and its unmistakable purpose and intent."
63
Since the United States was a UN signatory, the supremacy of the Charter under
Missouri v. Holland's interpretation of Article VI provided the federal government
with an authority over the states not otherwise granted by the Constitution.
6 4
Consequently, even though Sei Fujii was eventually overturned, the implication
was that "the UN treaty (and all treaties) could produce foreign interference in the
,65
exercise of American rights, including the rights of states." In particular, the case
implied that the human rights provisions of the UN Charter were self-executing and
that they effectively proscribed racial discrimination.
The Bricker Amendment, initially proposed in 1951, would have amended the
Supremacy Clause to assert that no treaty or executive agreement could be made
"respecting the rights and freedoms of citizens of the United States recognized in
57. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
58. See id. at 433.
59. See id. at 430-31.
60. Id. at 432.
61. Id. at 433.
62. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
63. Id. at 486.
64. See LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS
CONFRONTS THE EXECUTnVE 87-89 (1984).
65. Id. at 89.
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[the] Constitution [or] the character and form of government prescribed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States." 66 The idea behind the Bricker proposal
was 1) to deny the supremacy of international agreements or treaties over state and
federal law, including the Constitution, and 2) to assert that a treaty would be non-
self-executing. 67 During the first formal hearings, Senator Bricker emphasized that
"[tihe primary purpose of [the Resolution] is to prohibit the use of the treaty as an
instrument of domestic legislation for surrendering national sovereignty." 6s In truth,
the conservative Bricker supporters were primarily concerned with the potential
impact that the UN human rights conventions might have on racial segregation in
the South.69 Commentators have noted that "adoption of one treaty or another
might [have] led to challenges to corporal punishment in schools, the death penalty,
state... sodomy laws, or perhaps even any laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation."
70
Though the Senate in 1954 defeated the final Bricker proposal by one vote,
71
the political wrangling had forced the Eisenhower administration, as an
appeasement to the Bricker supporters, to pledge not to become "a party to any
such covenant [on human rights] or present it as a treaty for consideration by the
Senate." 72 This policy proved to be a substantial setback to human rights
protections that was not reversed until 1963. 73 Likewise, the Supreme Court issued
a plurality opinion in a 1957 case that reaffirmed that the treaty power was
subordinate to other constitutional provisions.74 The plurality in Reid v. Covert
stated, "[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution. 75 The United States' contemporary policy, partially derived from the
lasting legacy of the Bricker controversy and from the plurality holding in Reid v.
Covert, of insisting on the attachment of reservations, understandings, and
declarations ("RUDs") to its ratification of human rights conventions calls into
question its commitment to human rights protection.76 Professor Henkin writes:
'The policy of declaring human rights conventions non-self-executing achieves
what Senator Bricker sought to do by constitutional amendment. Senator Bricker
sought to prevent Congress from adopting legislation to implement human rights
66. S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951), reprinted in DuANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER
AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP app. A, at
221 (1988).
67. See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1441, 1464-65 (1994); Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency
and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 703-04 (1998).
68. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearing on S.J. Res. 130 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 1 (1952) (statement of Sen. John Bricker),
quoted in JOHNSON, supra note 64, at 85.
69. Paul, supra note 67, at 703.
70. Friedman, supra note 67, at 1465 (citations omitted).
71. See 100 CONG. REC. 2374-75 (1954).
72. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953) (testimony of Sen.
John Bricker), quoted in Thomas Buergenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9
HUM. RTs. L.J. 141, 146 (1988).
73. See generally Buergenthal, supra note 72, at 142-47.
74. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1957) (Black, J., plurality).
75. Id. at 16 (Black, J., plurality).
76. See generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
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treaties; United States reservations have made congressional legislation largely
unnecessary.",
77
B. American Exceptionalism and the Rejection of the ICC
The perceived threat posed to American sovereignty by the international
treaties and agreements that led to the Bricker debate fifty years ago finds its
contemporary corollary in the debate surrounding the establishment of the ICC. In
the case of the ICC, a perceived threat to sovereignty triggered the Bush
administration to retract President Clinton's signature from the Rome Statute. In
August 2002, the Bush administration signed into law the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act ("ASPA"), 7 8 a retaliatory measure specifically
designed to ensure that American and allied soldiers and government officials
would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC by granting the President the
power "to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the[ir] release"
from the court. 79 As Senator Helms bluntly noted during the ASPA Senate hearings,
the intent of the law is to "make certain that the United States does not
acknowledge the legitimacy of the ICC's bogus claim of jurisdiction over
American citizens." 80 While the Bricker supporters were concerned with
interference of foreign treaties and agreements into areas of traditional state
concern, ASPA supporters were concerned with the potential for a supranational
judicial body to supercede Article III courts and U.S. military courts in trying
American individuals and government officials for certain criminal offenses.
8
'
The catalyst for the rejection of the ICC and the implementation of ASPA, as
in the case of the Bricker debate fifty years ago, was a feared infringement on
national sovereignty believed by the United States to be constitutionally and
democratically inalienable. The United States' policy position regarding the ICC
prior to the enactment of the ASPA was that the ICC's jurisdictional authority is
incompatible with the U.S. Constitution. 82 Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute
states that the ICC will have territorial (ratione loci) jurisdiction over crimes
committed on the territory of states that have become party to the ICC, regardless
77. Id. at 349.
78. See generally American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401-33
(Law Co-op. Supp. 2003).
79. Id. § 7427(a).
80. The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen and Officials
from the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) [hereinafter ASPA Hearings] (statement of Sen. Jesse
Helms).
81. At least one commentator has creatively suggested that a supranational judicial
body vested with universal jurisdiction would not be constitutionally problematic. See Brian
F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REv. 257
(2000) (employing Chomskyan linguistic theory to suggest that the Framers' "deep
structure" understanding of judicial power, as reflected in the surface structure of the text of
Article It, confirms that Article III judges were never intended to be the exclusive
embodiment of that power).
82. See ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 328 (noting that the "US delegation rejected the
principle of universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity so
vehemently that the US defense secretary William Cohen threatened Germany and South
Korea with a US troop pull-out if they persisted in their support for its endorsement in the
statute").
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of the nationality of the offender.8 3 Some commentators have even argued that the
ICC's territorial jurisdiction might extend to crimes "committed outside the
territory of a State but might be deemed to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court
if its effects were felt on the territory." 84 Less controversially, Article 12(2)(b)
states that the Court will have personal (ratione personae) jurisdiction over the
citizens of states that have become party to the ICC. 85 Article 25 incorporates the
idea of individual criminal responsibility, 86 and Articles 27 and 28 reject the notion
87of state immunity. Broadly construed, the Rome Statute would empower the ICC
to prosecute citizens of non-state signatories if their actions were deemed to
constitute one of the enumerated crimes falling under the subject matter jurisdiction
of the Court and if the effects of their actions were deemed to have impacted the
territory of a state signatory.
As Senator Helms noted in defense of ASPA, "If other nations are going to
insist on placing Americans under the ICC's jurisdiction against their will, then
Congress has a right and responsibility to place a cost on their obstinacy, and to
ensure that our men and women in uniform are protected., 88 Implicit in Helms's
argument is the belief that the lifeblood of national sovereignty is a state's
exclusive right to adjudicate wrongs committed by citizens of that state. To validate
a supranational judicial body possessing universal jurisdiction over all individuals
for specific crimes deemed to have impacted the territory of a state signatory
"would be to transfer the ultimate authority to judge the policies adopted and
implemented by the elected officials of the United States-the core attribute of
sovereignty and the sine qua non of democratic self-government-away from the
American people and to the ICC's prosecutor and judicial branch. 89
According to opponents of the ICC, this transition of power to a transnational
judicial authority would implicate sovereignty in two ways. First, validation of the
ICC would violate the notion of democratic self-government by vesting judicial
authority in the hands of an unelected and unaccountable body.90 It would disrupt
what Madison called "[tihe genius of republican liberty"-the concept that "all
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted [sic] with it
should be kept in dependence on the people .. . ."91 Second, validation of the ICC
would interfere with the traditional notion that sovereign statehood carries with it
the responsibility for defining and maintaining the legal order within the territorial
boundaries of the nation-state.92 Since "[c]riminals are, by definition, prepared to
defy the law," 93 the ICC would necessarily imply a transfer of enforcement power
from the national context to the supranational context. Similarly, since "the Court
will not have police of its own to make arrests, [i]t will depend for its effectiveness
83. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(a), reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at
176.
84. SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 63.
85. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(b), reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at
176.
86. See id. art. 25, reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 183.
87. See id. arts. 27, 28, reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 184-85.
88. ASPA Hearings, supra note 80, at 2 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
89. Casey, supra note 7, at 843-44 (emphasis in original).
90. See id. at 844.
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 224 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
92. ASPA Hearings, supra note 80, at 16-17 (statement of Dr. Jeremy Rabkin, Professor,
Dep't of Gov't, Cornell Univ.).
93. Id.
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on the cooperation of signatory states. 94 As Senator Rod Grams suggested during
the ASPA hearings, however,
the greatest force for peace on this Earth is not an international court; it
is the United States military. Ironically, the very nations that have
created a court... have repeatedly called on the United States to be the
global enforcer. [A] treatz' which hinders our military is ... bad for the
international community.
C. Reconsidering the U.S. 's Position on Supranational Criminal Courts
Proponents of ASPA share an easily identifiable kinship with the earlier
proponents of the Bricker Amendment-namely, both groups perceived the
emerging universalization of human rights to be diametrically opposed to state
sovereignty. In the case of the Bricker debate, this tension was articulated as a
threat to federalism and an encroachment on state autonomy and diversity. In the
case of the ASPA, the tension was articulated as a threat to democratic self-
government and an affront to the constitutional principle that "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court" 96 and "shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . . Kinship
therefore stems from a common presupposition that denationalization and national
sovereignty exist in a state of perpetual tension. For both the Bricker and ASPA
supporters, to transfer authority from the national context to the supranational
context necessarily corresponds to a sacrifice of sovereignty.
In addition, a kinship stemming from a common theoretical conception of
national sovereignty shared by the Bricker and ASPA supporters and by the
historical proponents of temporary international criminal tribunals is equally
identifiable, if perhaps less explicit. Justice Jackson contributed to the legitimacy of
the IMT by suggesting that the crimes enumerated in the Charter were universally
applicable to all states; however, his correspondence with President Truman
illustrated that he recognized that while laws may be theoretically universal, their
applicability to victor and vanquished varies tremendously. The Nirnberg and
Tokyo tribunals, as noted, were occupational courts. They existed as judicial
surrogates for German and Japanese courts by providing legal order to the
vanquished nations. Similarly, the ICTY and ICTR were designed to restore peace
in a specific territory deemed by the UN to be too unstable to self-adjudicate. In
this sense, all of the tribunals were limited in duration, subject matter, and
territorial reach.
The historical precedent set by the temporary international criminal tribunals
has been that the adjudication of international criminal law occurs in the context of
state sovereignty and exists to reintroduce state sovereignty to a legally decimated
territory. Traditionally, temporary international criminal tribunals have provided de
facto validation to the sovereign notions of territorial integrity and political
independence.9 8 Supporters of ASPA similarly adhere to this traditional conception
94. Id. at 13. (response of Dr. Jeremy Rabkin, Professor, Dep't of Gov't, Cornell Univ.
to additional questions for the record)
95. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams).
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
97. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
98. For an illuminating discussion of these interrelated concepts and their relationship
to state sovereignty, see generally Christos L. Rozakis, Territorial Integrity and Political
2004]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of sovereignty. They embody the unstated assumptions in Justice Jackson's
opening statement-namely, that humanitarian law may indeed be universal so
long as it is victor's justice.
III. RECONSIDERING UNITED STATES SOVEREIGNTY
Political discourse on state sovereignty in the international context has
contributed to a constantly evolving, but consistently controversial, notion of what
it means for a state to be "sovereign." 99 This Part will briefly trace the development
of the dominant, theologically-derived discourse on sovereignty and consider its
continued validity in light of the emerging emphasis on global governance. In
addition, this Part will suggest an alternative to the traditional sovereignty
dialectic--one by which the national identity-building principles associated with
state sovereignty are preserved while the protective territorialism likewise
associated with the term is eliminated. Finally, this Part will urge a reformulation
of sovereignty that complements global denationalization and will conclude by
considering the potential impact of this reformulation on the United States' position
regarding the ICC.
A. Sovereignty, Traditionally Understood
The development of the political notion of sovereignty has been characterized
as a process of ideology-creation---the use of an abstract theological structure to
describe the temporal political structure. 1° Professor Elshtain has suggested that
"Bodin and Hobbes are each implicated in the birth of ideology" and "the
peculiarly modern habit of justifying political acts by reference to abstract,
metaphysical ideals."'' l Jean Bodin argued that "it is the distinguishing mark of the
sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is
he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends
obsolete law."' 0 2 Thomas Hobbes suggested that implicit in the process of granting
consent to be governed to a single ruler or assembly-a characteristic of the social
contract-based Leviathan state-is the creation of "that Mortall God, to which wee
owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence... And he that carryeth this
Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power, and every one
besides, his SUBJECT.", °3 Residing at the heart of this ideological abstraction is the
implicit concession that temporal political sovereignty, unlike theological
sovereignty, cannot be absolute. In an international order where there is always
another sovereign state next door, cooperation is unavoidable.
The emerging ideology of state sovereignty was consequently both
empowering and humbling. It was empowering in the sense that through the
Independence, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 812-18 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 2000).
99. See, e.g., Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 500-01 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
100. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1355 (1991).
101. Id. at 1363 (quotation omitted).
102. JEAN BODIN, Six BooKs OF THE COMMONWEALTH 28 (M.J. Tooley trans., Barnes &
Noble 1967) (1576).
103. THOMAs HOBBES, THE LEvIATHAN 227-28 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651) (emphases in original).
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creation of the social contract, sovereignty was transferred from the king to the
state, which "c[ould] no more alienate its sovereignty than a man c[ould] alienate
his will and remain a man." 104 The social contract provided the theoretical
precedent through which the body politic was deemed to itself constitute the
sovereign.1°5 Through this process, sovereignty became critical for state identity-
the "essential qualification for full membership in international society, . . . the
qualification which ma[de] a state eligible for full membership. '" 1 6 As Professor
Elshtain noted: 'The state is 'sovereign in the domestic context' and this
sovereignty qualifies it for that agonistic arena, the international system."'' 0 7 "The
international community has repeatedly recognized sovereignty as the most sacred
and fundamental right that a nation can possess."' 08 Sovereignty was also humbling
in that a necessary step in the process of creating a theologically-derived
conception of state sovereignty was the imposition of limits. 109 Because state
sovereignty is not synonymous with the theological conception of sovereignty as
absolute dominion and omnipotence, it is an imprecise mimesis of theological
sovereignty. Professor Delbrtick has noted that "sovereignty as a principle of
international law has never been absolute, but relative in the sense that the
sovereignty of one state found its legal limits in the sovereignty of the other
states."' 1° For one state to assert an unbridled and absolute sovereignty would by
implication infringe on the sovereignty of another state.
The historical development of state sovereignty in the international context
reflects an attempt to mediate the humbling and empowering aspects of sovereignty
in a way that bolsters institutional legitimacy. Inherent in the discourse on
sovereignty is the tension that arises when an area of international law, traditionally
understood to fall within the exclusive dominion of the nation-state, begins to
transcend that rigid framework. For instance, in the decades following the Treaty of
Westphalia, nation-states were individualistic and thrived on self-sufficiency.'
Arnold Brecht described this post-Westphalia, boundary-establishing period of
state sovereignty: "Within a country's boundaries no law counts other than that
issued by the sovereign . . . -no higher law, no imperial law, no divine law, no
natural law. There is no appeal to any higher court, no arbiter, avenger or ultimate
104. CHARLES E. MERRIAM JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE
ROUSSEAU: STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 33 (Garland Publishing 1972)
(1900).
105. Id. at 33-35.
106. ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 7
(1986).
107. Elshtain, supra note 100, at 1369.
108. Joshua B. Bevitz, Flawed Foreign Policy: Hypocritical U.S. Attitudes Toward
International Criminal Forums, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 951 (2002).
109. Interestingly, the twentieth century French thinker Georges Bataille, influenced
heavily by Nietzschean philosophy, proposed that sovereignty could in fact be lifted
unscathed from theology and imposed without limits on the social order. In this case,
"[S]overeignty is always linked to a denial of the sentiments that death controls. Sovereignty
requires the strength to violate the prohibition against killing .. " 3 GEORGES BATAILLE,
THE ACCURSED SHARE 220-23 (Robert Hurley trans., 1991). Obviously, this conception of
sovereignty, while perhaps truer to the theological notion of the term, would prove quite
problematic for fostering international cooperation.
110. Delbrfick, Legal Developments, supra note 47, at 427.
111. Delbruck, Structural Changes, supra note 47, at 4-5.
2004]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
guardian of peace and justice."' 12 At this time, international law was governed by
the principle of liberum ius ad bellum, the sovereign right to freely go to war to
enforce state territorial interests. 1 3 Legitimacy was dependent on might and the
continued sustainability of the individualistic nation-state. During the nineteenth
century, however, industrialization and market expansion required the post-
Westphalia nation-state to forego self-sufficiency and to cooperate internationally
to maintain domestic sustainability. 114 In terms of the social contract, each state's
public obligation to its people could not be realized without international
cooperation. 15 The empowering social contract and identity-forming aspects of
state sovereignty had to be rebalanced in light of sovereignty's new countervailing
limitations.
The constant struggle to balance the empowering with the limiting aspects of
sovereignty, exemplified by the gradual transition from "independence" to
"interdependence," also occurred in the development of international criminal law.
After World War II, the notion of peace and security was reconceptualized to
transcend the responsibility of the territorial nation-state and to become an
international legal concern. 116 This reconceptualization was institutionalized in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."'"17 By acknowledging the authority of the
UN, state signatories thus voluntarily relinquished the liberum ius ad bellum and
accepted the legitimacy of the UN to pursue their rights and interests-at least
insofar as they related to international peace and security. Still, the countervailing
notion, exemplified by Article 2(1), that the UN Charter is "a constitution of the
community of states ... still clearly committed to the respect and the protection of
the 'sovereign equality' of all the members of the United Nations Organization,""1
8
moderated this relinquishment. Legitimacy was dependent on effectively balancing
the empowering aspects of sovereignty with the limitations imposed on the concept
by the emerging international order. Indeed, the period of the emerging
international order reflected ambivalence about the role that state sovereignty
should continue to play in an increasingly interdependent world." 9
B. The Global Transcendence of Traditional Sovereignty
The processes of globalization exacerbate the ambivalence that surrounded the
continued viability of state sovereignty during the period of international
cooperation. Globalization entails a less state-centered approach to solving
supranational issues-a process of tackling "challenges [that] are inherently
beyond the problem-solving capacity of the territorial nation-state and at the same
112. Arnold Brecht, Sovereignty, in WAR IN OUR TIME 58, 64 (Hans Speier & Alfred
Kdhler eds., 1939).
113. Delbruick, Structural Changes, supra note 47, at 4-5.
114. See id. at 6.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., id. at 10.
117. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
118. Delbriick, Structural Changes, supra note 47, at 12-13.
119. Id. at 13 (arguing that ambivalence occurs because international obligations
necessarily restrict state sovereignty but that "respect and protection of state sovereignty
[curiously] remains a major factor in international relations").
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time affect humankind as a whole, regardless of borders and territorial
jurisdictions."' 20 Thus, "[a]s political, economic and social activities, in view of the
inherently transnational character of the problems to be solved, 'are increasingly
stretched across the globe, they become in a significant sense no longer primarily
or solely organized according to a territorial principle."' 121 Yet, the modem global
legal order "is [still] a legal order predominately [among] coordinated, juxtaposed
States as its typical subjects."'' 22 Even the Supreme Court has occasionally paid
homage to the ever-presence of sovereignty: "Rulers come and go; governments
end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society
cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in
suspense." 123 Thus, "[i]f a legal theory is seen as the attempt to explain the
structures and implications of a given legal order, the theory of international law
must take into account this attitude of States."'' 24 Commentaries that disregard state
sovereignty as an eradicable hindrance to denationalization fail to recognize the
possible benefits to be gained by simply redrawing the balance between
sovereignty's empowering and limiting aspects.'
25
Rather than eliminating sovereignty as a political ideology, a more productive
enterprise would be to refocus the discourse away from the traditional structural
understanding of the term, which only serves to accentuate the level of discrepancy
between the theological and the political definitions of the term and which
ultimately leaves the false impression that absolute sovereignty is somehow
realizable in the international political sphere.'26 This refocus would constitute a
shift toward a functional conception of sovereignty, wherein the purpose that state
sovereignty would serve in any given situation would itself determine its limits. 1
27
This discursive shift in emphasis toward a functional understanding of sovereignty
would facilitate recognition of sovereignty's "neglected counter-side: sovereignty
is not only a claim of freedom from external interference, it is also the liberty to
permit some kinds of external interference." 128 Since global interdependence
creates a functional necessity for transnational cooperation, this reformulation of
120. Id. at 15.
121. Id. at 16.
122. Steinberger, supra note 99, at 517.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
124. Steinberger, supra note 99, at 517; see also Elshtain, supra note 100, at 1368
(arguing that "[t]he least interesting treatments of this theme are those that condemn
sovereignty and go on to construct a fantasy world that would come into being were
sovereignty dissolved altogether").
125. For instance, Louis Henkin has written that "as applied to states in the
international system, 'sovereignty' is a mistake, indeed a mistake built upon mistakes, which
has barnacled an unfortunate mythology." Louis Henkin, Sibley Lecture, March 1994:
Human Rights and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 31, 31 (1996). Although
Henkin proposes to "deconstruct" this myth of sovereignty, he ultimately leaves the myth in
place while suggesting that human rights are "a radical derogation from the axiom of
,sovereignty."' Id. at 38.
126. See Ivan Simonovic, State Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More
Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381, 402 (2000) (arguing that because the history of the
term "sovereignty" illustrates its elasticity and imperviousness to categorical definition, it
should be able to adapt to the changes ushered in by globalization as well).
127. See generally, Post-lecture discussion between John H. Robinson and Jean Bethke
Elshtain on Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self, (March 2, 1991), in Elshtain,
supra note 100, at 1379-84.
128. Havel, supra note 81, at 327 (emphasis in original).
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sovereignty would suggest that in areas of law where the traditional nation-state is
deemed ill-equipped to regulate, deference to global governance would
paradoxically bolster that state's sovereignty. "In other words, if sovereignty now
expresses a reanimated sense of autonomy, it does so in the guise of a perfectly
rational paradox: its existence also is defined by its capacity to be given away."'
' 29
This reformulation would replace the misguided structural balance between the
empowering and limiting aspects of sovereignty, which posited international
cooperation as a tolerable concession, with a functional understanding of
sovereignty strengthened by cooperation. Truly transnational concerns would no
longer simply be tolerated derogations of sovereignty; rather, "they [would become]
emanations of that sovereignty." 130 Perhaps most importantly, under this
reformulation, sovereignty would no longer exist in diametrical opposition to
global denationalization.
This reformulation of sovereignty would also facilitate a reformulation of the
social contract. Instead of individuals giving "up some of their powers and
sovereign rights and transfer[ing] them to a state for the benefit of safeguarding
their interests ... [,] [i]t is the states, upon demand of their citizens and pressed by
nongovernment organizations, that transfer some powers and rights to international
organizations."' 31 In other words, where rights were originally transferred from the
individual to the state, now individuals-the true sovereigns-decide for
themselves which governing body is best able to protect their fundamental
interests. 132 Without using the term "sovereignty," Hannah Arendt posits a
meaningful parallel distinction between illegitimate power-namely, territorial
dominion-and legitimate power-namely, "a 'something' that comes into being
when citizens come to know and to enact a good in common that they cannot know
alone .. 133 The reformulation of sovereignty not only eliminates the fallacy that
in all circumstances relinquishment of authority through processes of
denationalization is detrimental to state sovereignty but also serves to re-empower
the individual by asserting that the key to legitimization resides within the civil
society rather than with the state. If society deems a supranational entity better
equipped to regulate a particular area of traditional state concern, then the
relinquishment of the state's regulating power would not only reify the rational
paradox of functional sovereignty, but also further the legitimacy of the
supranational entity by granting it the symbolic backing of both the state and
society.
Kofi Annan has suggested that the idea of "individual sovereignty"--the
"consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her destiny 
-
34
_
has sparked a reformulation of the traditional notion of state sovereignty in the
realm of humanitarian law. The declaration that some human rights constitute erga
129. id. at 328.
130. Id. at 330.
131. Simonovic, supra note 126, at 392.
132. See id.
133. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 583, 584 (2000). See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION (1958).
134. Press Release, Kofi Annan, Annual Report to the General Assembly (Sept. 20,
1999), available at http:llwww.un.org/NewslPress/docs/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html (last
visitied Jan. 27, 2004).
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omnes norms, 135 which are norms applicable to all individuals regardless of
citizenship status and enforceable by all states regardless of the existence of a
territorial link between the crime and the enforcing state, reflects this changing
conception of humanitarian law. Professor Delbrilck has noted that "a very large
majority of states ... accept the notion of human rights based on the dignity of the
human person, and view as indispensable international protection of human rights
without or even against the will of individual states." 13 6 Still, some countries
continue to rebuff the international concern for human rights to shield a traditional,
boundary-driven sense of sovereignty. 37 This resistance illustrates that while some
human rights may be universal erga omnes norms, nation-states that continue to
operate within the framework of traditional sovereignty and that only begrudgingly
accept the necessity for international cooperation fail to recognize the real source of
global sovereignty.
C. Global Sovereignty, the United States, and the International Criminal Court
As illustrated, the United States has consistently resisted plans to implement a
permanent international criminal tribunal while simultaneously heralding efforts to
establish temporary criminal tribunals based on a territorial, boundary-driven
notion of sovereignty. 138 Indeed, the United States has provided a consistent
example of the traditional notion that state sovereignty is irreconcilable with global
denationalization. 139 Commentators have suggested that "America's self-
conception has from the beginning involved a sense of world historical uniqueness
and ineluctable destiny."' 14° While this national hubris is not obviously reconciled
with a functional notion of sovereignty empowered by cooperation, two features of
American government suggest otherwise-namely, the presence of a weak state
coupled with a vibrant civil society and the "supremacy of public opinion in
foreign relations."' 14 1 For example, Alexis de Tocqueville's study characterized
American democracy as "a lightly governed society with an engaged citizenry
building their community through a myriad of 'voluntary associations' . . . .,,142 In
addition to the strength of American civil society, James Bryce articulated the
centrality of public opinion in American government: "Towering over presidents
and state governors, over Congress and state legislatures, over conventions and the
vast machinery of party, public opinion stands out, in the United States, as the great
source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it.', 143 The strength of
American civil society coupled with the preeminence of public opinion in the
135. See ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 239; Jost Delbruick, The Role of the United
Nations in Dealing with Global Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277, 289-90
(1997).
136. Delbruick, Structural Changes, supra note 47, at 22.
137. See, e.g., Simonovic, supra note 126, at 389.
138. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 7, at 855 (arguing within the traditional sovereignty
paradigm that the ICC's claim of universal jurisdiction "would require the application of a
universality principle that is inconsistent with, and superior to, the territorial principle").
139. See Bickley, supra note 8, at 216 (chronicling the history of United States
exceptionalism in political policy making).
140. James Reed, Why Is the USA Not a Like-Minded Country?, in ENHANCING GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW DIPLOMACY? 55, 57 (Andrew F. Cooper et al. eds., 2002).
141. Id. at 57-58.
142. Id. at 58.
143. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 923 (Liberty Fund 1995) (1888).
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formation of American foreign policy suggests that the functional approach to
sovereignty, which reconstructs the social contract to reflect the preeminence of the
individual as the true sovereign, might in fact flourish in the United States.
Though this functional approach to sovereignty has yet to have gained
ascendancy in the United States, it is possible to predict how this reformulation of
sovereignty might affect United States' policy toward the development of
international criminal law and, in particular, the establishment of the ICC. If it can
be acce4ted that certain human rights have ascended to the status of erga omnes
norms, and that humanity, rather than territory, now serves as the jurisdictional
link for these crimes, 45 then, under the functional approach to sovereignty, for the
United States to resist the universal precedence of these erga omnes norms would
constitute an illegitimate usurpation by the state of a sovereign power actually
residing with the individual. In this sense, governmental resistance to international
human rights treaties and agreements, exemplified historically by the Bricker
controversy, would be untenable since the state would be attempting to rely on
traditional, territorial sovereignty to deny to its citizens universal human rights. A
functional reformulation of United States' sovereignty would expose some of the
problems with traditional territorial sovereignty as it applies to erga omnes human
rights because the state would be able to represent the wishes of its sovereign
constituency without fearing that it might, in the process of delegating authority, be
"losing" sovereignty.
On the other hand, for the ratification of the ICC to be legitimate from the
functional understanding of sovereignty, it would have to appear that the court's
limited subject matter should be adjudicated by a supranational forum and that the
forum itself would be institutionally legitimate. Both requirements might be
problematic. First, while it could be argued that three of the crimes falling under
the ICC's jurisdiction are erga omnes norms (the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes), there is no comparable international precedent
establishing that the fourth crime (aggression) is likewise universally recognized.146
The Rome Statute explicitly indicates that jurisdiction over "aggression" will occur
once the crime is defined, 147 suggesting not only that there is no universally
recognized crime of aggression that transcends the nation-state but also that the
crime would eventually be legislatively created by the UN pursuant to Article
121. 14 The ICC's subject matter jurisdiction over "aggression" would be
problematic from the perspective of functional sovereignty in the sense that the
crime is not an erga omnes norm and the provision calling for the crime to be
legislatively defined would not contribute to its universalization.
Second, the institutional structure of the ICC as a fair adjudicatory body would
need to be universally recognized for the transference of authority to be legitimate.
Unlike erga omnes norms, "there are a number of competing (and often openly
hostile) views on [law, justice, and procedural fairness]" that would hinder this
universal acceptance.149 One commentator noted that while the Rome Conference
delegates attempted to incorporate procedural and judicial elements from both the
Civil Law and Common Law traditions, "[t]he result [wa]s a jerry-rigged system,
144. See Delbriick, supra note 135, at 289-90.
145. See ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 239.
146. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1), reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 169.
147. Id. art. 5(2), reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 169.
148. Id. arts. 5(2), 121, reprinted SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 169.
149. Casey, supra note 7, at 842.
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internally inconsistent, that lack[ed] the legitimizing force of the approval and
acceptance that these separate systems have earned over the centuries."' 150 In this
sense, it would be difficult to argue, as in the case of erga omnes norms, that the
ICC, itself a product of political compromise, somehow embodies a universal
procedural right so central that it should supercede the jurisdiction of domestic
courts in the adjudication of certain crimes.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, international crimes deemed to be erga omnes norms have attained
a level of universality which the institutions designed to adjudicate them have not.
This conclusion brings us to a point where Justice Jackson's statement that the
crimes enumerated in the London Agreement are universally applicable is perhaps
more understandable, if not less hypocritical. While Justice Jackson was willing to
conclude that the Allies "are not prepared to lay down [at Niirnberg] a rule of
criminal conduct against others which we would be unwilling to have invoked
against us," 151 he never suggested that the mere promulgation of universal
principles of law would likewise mandate a universal means of enforcement. The
process of legitimizing institutions designed to adjudicate erga omnes norms
necessarily lags behind the declaration of those norms as universal simply because
the institutional structure of the adjudicatory body itself demands independent
acceptance. Thus, from the perspective of the functional reformulation of
sovereignty, support for the Bricker Amendment and similar isolationist
perspectives that deny the universality of erga omnes norms based on a traditional,
territorial notion of sovereignty is untenable. Conversely, even the functional
reformulation of sovereignty would not make it any more likely that the United
States would ratify the ICC unless it could somehow be shown not only that
aggression had attained erga omnes status but also that the court's institutional and
procedural structure was itself universally recognized. For this to be accomplished,
the individual members of society, as the true sovereigns, would have to recognize
the common good to be gained by the transference of institutional authority from
their own domestic courts to the supranational ICC-a task which assuredly was
not fulfilled at the Rome Conference.
150. Id. at 843.
151. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 25, at 330.
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